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Abstract
We study the impact of a public school choice lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools on college 
enrollment and degree completion. We find a significant overall increase in college attainment 
among lottery winners who attend their first choice school. Using rich administrative data on 
peers, teachers, course offerings and other inputs, we show that the impacts of choice are strongly 
predicted by gains on several measures of school quality. Gains in attainment are concentrated 
among girls. Girls respond to attending a better school with higher grades and increases in college-
preparatory course-taking, while boys do not.
Today’s urban schools face increasing pressure to matriculate students who are ready for 
college. Growing returns to post-secondary education and shrinking middle-wage 
employment make college degree completion necessary for upward mobility into the 
American middle class (Goldin and Katz 2007; Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008). Improving 
the quality of high school education has become a first-order issue for economic growth, 
national competitiveness (U.S. Department of Education 2006; Roderick, Nagaoka and Coca 
2009), and equality of economic opportunity in light of the increasing wage returns to higher 
education (Turner 2004; Dynarski 2008; Heckman and LaFontaine 2010; Acemoglu and 
Autor 2010). Yet there is little causal evidence on which policies can increase college 
attainment for students most in need (Murnane 2008).
In this paper we study the impact of winning a lottery to attend a public high school in 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) on college enrollment and degree completion. CMS 
implemented an open enrollment public school choice program in the Fall of 2002, ending 
three decades of busing for racial integration and offering high school choice to students 
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from all socio-economic backgrounds. Students were guaranteed admission to their 
neighborhood school but were allowed to choose and rank up to three schools in the district, 
and slots to over-subscribed schools were assigned by lottery number. Students coming from 
low-performing high schools actively participated in the choice plan, often choosing 
substantially higher-performing high schools over their neighborhood school option.
We use student-level administrative data from CMS linked to the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC), a national database of postsecondary enrollment which records 
college enrollment and degree completion for almost all colleges in the U.S.1 We use 
assignment by random lottery numbers to chosen schools to identify the causal impact of 
attending a chosen school on secondary and post-secondary educational attainment. Our 
approach is similar to prior research that uses school lotteries to estimate impacts on 
elementary and secondary achievement (Rouse 1998; Howell and Peterson 2002; Hoxby and 
Rockoff 2005; Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2006; Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008; Wolf et al. 
2008; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011; 
Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman 2012).
Overall we find small but statistically significant increases in high school graduation, 
postsecondary attendance and degree completion for students who win the lottery to attend 
their first choice school. We also find that the gains from school choice are almost entirely 
concentrated among girls. Girls who attend their first choice school are 14 percentage points 
more likely to complete a four-year college degree, yet we find no significant impacts for 
boys across a variety of measures of postsecondary attainment.
We then examine how the impact of choice varies with school characteristics. We construct a 
measure of college “value-added”, which measures a school’s likelihood of sending students 
to college, conditional on prior characteristics.2 We show that lottery winners with the 
largest gains in school quality experience the largest gains in postsecondary attainment. This 
is possible because most students who did not get their first choice were assigned to their 
neighborhood school. Since the probability of winning the lottery is unrelated to 
neighborhood school assignment, and since it is a fixed characteristic at the time of 
application (like race or gender), we can compare applicants who choose the same school 
but who have neighborhood schools of different quality.
Using rich administrative data on school and peer inputs, we show that high-quality schools 
differ from low-quality schools along several dimensions. They have students with higher 
baseline math scores, a higher fraction of teachers with degrees from selective colleges, and 
a higher faction of students completing college-preparatory course requirements. While we 
do not have enough statistical power to separate the contribution of each of these variables, 
we do show that only girls appear to gain from attending higher quality schools.
1The NSC covers over 90 percent of 4-year college enrollment nationwide and in North Carolina. CMS sent every student who had 
ever been enrolled in any grade to the NSC for matching. Rising 9th graders in the Fall of 2002, the first year of new school choice 
assignments, could have completed up to five years of post-secondary enrollment, enabling us to measure both matriculation and 
degree completion over a reasonable horizon.
2We measure school “value-added” using pre-school choice cohorts only, to address any potential reflection problem with members of 
the lottery sample (Manski 1993).
Deming et al. Page 2













This suggests that girls are more responsive to gains in school quality – or alternatively, that 
a change in environment is more costly for boys. While boys and girls choose similar quality 
schools on average and start at their new schools in similar courses with similar class rank, 
only girls remain “on track” throughout high school. By the end of high school, female 
lottery winners had higher grade point averages, had completed significantly more college-
level coursework, and were more likely to take the SAT. Male lottery winners, on the other 
hand, dropped significantly in class rank, showed no difference in college-level coursework, 
and were significantly more likely to fail an end-of-course exam in the upper grades. This 
pattern of results mirrors the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Experiment (Kling, Liebman 
and Katz 2007), as well as many recent studies in school settings (e.g. Hastings, Kane and 
Staiger 2006, Anderson 2008, Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos 2009, Angrist and Lavy 2009, 
Jackson 2010, Lavy and Schlosser 2011, Lavy, Silva and Weinhardt 2011, Legewie and 
DiPrete 2012).
Taken together, the evidence suggests that girls responded to a more academically 
demanding environment with increased effort, while boys did not. This is consistent with 
prior work showing gender differences in study habits and time spent on homework (Jacob 
2002, Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Frenette and Zeman 2007). Girls might also be more 
responsive to increased school quality because of differences in the expected return to a 
college education (Charles and Luoh 2003, Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko 2006, DiPrete and 
Buchmann 2006). Boys may respond to changes in social environment with maladaptive 
behavior, perhaps due to differences in coping behavior, peer norms, or differential response 
to relative rank within social group (e.g. Roderick 2003, Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2006, 
Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Barankay, 2011). The bottom line is that the impacts we 
observe are the net effect of behavioral responses and adjustments by the students 
themselves, as well as their peers, teachers and parents (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011).
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of school choice on 
postsecondary attainment using a lottery-based research design.3 A series of recent papers 
use rule-based secondary school assignment to identify the impacts of school and/or peer 
quality for students at the margin of admission (Clark 2010, Jackson 2010, Pop-Eleches and 
Urquiola 2011, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011, Dobbie and Fryer 2011). Like the research 
design here, these papers share the limitation that they cannot unpack the impact of changing 
school assignment into changes in peer quality, teacher quality, or other important inputs. 
However, unlike the studies cited above, our research design enables us to observe impacts 
across the full range of prior academic preparation and relative rank. Attending a higher-
quality school may have heterogeneous impacts in a high school setting, where course 
tracking and peer group identity are important features of the schooling experience.
We also build on an important literature in economics that studies the determinants and 
impacts of school quality (e.g. Hanushek 1986, Card and Krueger 1992, Betts 1995, 
3Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006) and Deming (2011) examine misbehavior and crime using high school lotteries. Booker et al. (2011) 
and Lavy (2010) use difference-in-difference, instrumental variable and regression discontinuity approaches to estimate the impact of 
public school choice on high school graduation. Fryer (2011) uses a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the impact of 
adopting charter school practices in low-performing public high schools on a variety of outcomes, including college attendance among 
students in 12th grade at the beginning of the year.
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Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2005). Ultimately, we cannot rule out the importance of peer 
effects versus other inputs that can be directly manipulated by schools. However, we can 
show that school “value-added” measures, which control directly for observed differences in 
peer quality, also predict the impacts of school choice. More generally, we show convincing 
evidence that school choice only benefits applicants when they gain access to higher quality 
schools, however defined. Thus at least in this setting, there is no benefit of choice per se – 
rather, school choice is a mechanism through which students can gain access to higher 
quality schools. Finally, our finding of gender differences in responsiveness to school quality 
is an important potential explanation for the growing female advantage in completed 
schooling (Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko 2006, Diprete and Buchmann 2006, Bailey and 
Dynarski 2011).
I. Background
Charlotte-Mecklenburg is a large and diverse school district encompassing Mecklenburg 
County, which includes both the inner city areas of Charlotte, North Carolina as well as its 
suburbs. In 1971, the Supreme Court (in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education) ruled that neighborhood segregation resulted in de facto segregated schools, and 
for over 30 years CMS schools bused students across the district to achieve racial 
desegregation. In 2001 this historic court order was overturned and the busing plan was 
terminated.
In December of 2001, the CMS School Board voted to move forward with district-wide open 
enrollment for the 2002-2003 school year. In the spring of 2002, CMS asked parents to 
submit up to three choices for the upcoming school year for each child, listed in order of 
preference. CMS conducted an extensive information campaign to encourage parents to 
submit choice forms, including a comprehensive booklet with information about each school 
(Hastings and Weinstein 2008). Importantly, they told parents that school choice forms were 
required to receive a school assignment in the subsequent year. This resulted in over 95 
percent of parents submitting a choice application in the spring of 2002.
Each child received guaranteed access to their neighborhood school, which was usually (but 
not always) the closest to their home address.4 Students were assigned to their neighborhood 
school by default, and admission for all other students was subject to grade-specific capacity 
limits that were set by the district beforehand but were not known to families at the time of 
the lottery (Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008).5 When demand for slots among non-
guaranteed applicants exceeded supply, admission was allocated by lottery. Random lottery 
numbers were assigned within the following priority groups – (1) Students that attended the 
school in the previous year and their siblings; (2) Free- or reduced-price-lunch-eligible 
(FRPL) students applying to schools where less than half of the previous year’s school 
population was FRPL; (3) Students applying to a school within their own choice zone. In 
addition, siblings of currently enrolled children received guaranteed access. CMS was also 
4Parents who listed three non-guaranteed choices were automatically assigned their “home school” as a 4th choice.
5The district communicated to parents that if they did not submit a choice form, it was unclear which school their child would be 
assigned to. Thus parents who wanted their child’s home school submitted a choice form with the home school listed as their first 
choice.
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divided into four “choice zones” and free transportation was provided by the district, but 
only within each zone. Families could also provide their own transportation to any school.6 
The district expanded capacity at schools where they anticipated high demand in an attempt 
to give everyone their first choice. Still, many high schools were oversubscribed. Applicants 
were sorted by priority group according to these rules, and then assigned a random lottery 
number. Slots at each school were first filled by students with guaranteed access, and then 
remaining slots were allocated within each priority group according to lottery numbers. If all 
members of a priority group could be offered admission, slots were allocated to the next 
group in the order of lottery numbers. CMS administered the lottery centrally and applied an 
algorithm known as a “first choice maximizer” (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003). This 
meant that CMS first allocated slots to all those who listed a school as their first choice and 
only then moved to second choices. As the name indicates, this maximized the share of 
students who received their first choice. However, it also meant that students who lost the 
lottery to attend their first choice school almost always found that their second choice had 
been filled up in the previous round. While there is the potential for strategic choice with this 
type of lottery mechanism, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2008) show that this is not likely to 
have been a large problem in CMS, at least in the first year of the choice plan.
II. Data Description
We match the lottery applicant files to a panel of administrative data from CMS. The lottery 
applicant files contain individual choices, lottery numbers, priority groupings and 
admissions outcomes. We supplement this with administrative data on all students from 
1996 to 2009. These data contain detailed information on student demographics, enrollment 
histories, test scores, and course-taking. We use data from the school years prior to the 
lottery to construct a set of pre-treatment variables that can be used to test the validity of the 
randomization and to examine treatment effect heterogeneity. These pre-treatment covariates 
include demographic information such as gender, race, eligibility for free or reduced price 
lunch (an indicator of poverty), and students’ scores on standardized End-of-Grade (EOG) 
exams in math and reading up to grade 8. We also use prior address information to calculate 
median household income in a student’s neighborhood, and we assign them to “home” 
schools using high school neighborhood catchment areas.
The student records from CMS include linked individual-level information on college 
attendance from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). The NSC is a non-profit 
organization that maintains data on enrollment and graduation for students at over 90 percent 
of colleges nationwide. In collaboration with CMS, we constructed a comprehensive list of 
students who had ever been enrolled in CMS and were old enough to have matriculated to 
college, regardless of the last grade they attended in CMS. CMS then provided this list to 
NSC for use in matching to postsecondary records. Due to limited coverage of college 
experiences in the NSC, our main outcome variables are enrollment and degree receipt by 
6The choice zones were constructed so that there was at least one predominately white suburban and at least one predominantly black 
inner-city school in each zone. In addition, free transportation was provided to several “all-zone” magnets from any zone in the 
district.
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college type – both two year and four year, as well as measures of college selectivity that are 
based on the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges.7
Although not all colleges provide information to the NSC, the coverage is very good in 
North Carolina and the surrounding states. The online Appendix contains a list of colleges 
by coverage and a detailed analysis of the match process using data from the Department of 
Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Data Source (IPEDS) as a reference. 8 Critically, 
students who leave CMS are followed in the NSC data. While we cannot observe test scores 
or course-taking for these students, we can measure their college attendance as long as they 
were ever enrolled in CMS. Thus, for postsecondary outcomes only, bias from non-random 
attrition is not a concern. Attrition is subject only to the NSC’s coverage and the quality of 
the match. Unless coverage is differential for lottery winners and losers, the results may be 
attenuated but not otherwise biased.
We also use CMS administrative data to examine impacts on high school graduation and a 
variety of school outcomes such as grades, exam scores and college-level course-taking. We 
use these data to measure students’ performance in and progress through courses that leave 
them “on track” to graduate with a college-preparatory diploma according to North Carolina 
standards, as well as participation in special programs such as AVID and ROTC.9 We further 
add information on yearly measures of school resources such as class size, books and 
computers from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI). Finally, we 
use CMS personnel files to construct school- and class-level measures of teacher and 
guidance counselor characteristics such as years of experience, college quality, and licensing 
and certification.
III. Sample Characteristics and School Attributes
CMS received high school lottery applications from 29,584 high school students. We first 
limit the sample to students who were enrolled in any CMS school in the previous year. 
About six percent of applicants come from outside the district, and these students are much 
less likely to be enrolled in CMS the following fall. Since previous enrollment status is fixed 
at the time of the lottery, this sample restriction does not affect the validity of the 
randomization. We also exclude from the sample the small number of students who apply to 
special education programs. Finally, we exclude rising 12th graders from the analysis sample 
because of concerns about correct randomization.10 This leaves an analysis sample of 
20,021 students.
7While all colleges in the NSC data report graduation, some do not report degree type. However, this can be inferred by the level of 
the school (i.e. four year or two year college). Information on major and degree is available for graduates of about 65 percent of the 
colleges covered by the NSC in our data (the share is 75 percent when colleges are weighted by the number of total enrollment spells 
in our data). The NSC data have no information about grades, and only collect data on choice of major for a subset of graduates.
8The major two-year college in Charlotte, Central Piedmont Community College (CPCC), did not provide information to the NSC 
until 2006. To fill in this gap, we obtained enrollment data directly from CPCC for all years. We also used the CPCC data to verify the 
NSC’s match process. See the Data Appendix for details.
9The formal math and science requirements for graduation in North Carolina include only Algebra I and Biology, yet a “college prep” 
course of study requires the completion of Geometry and Algebra II as well. The UNC system required students to complete an 
additional math course that has Algebra II as a prerequisite and 2 credits in the same foreign language. For more information see: 
http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/curriculum/home/graduationrequirements.pdf.
10We have analyzed the individual choice lotteries to confirm that random numbers determine offers of admission, and have found 
that they hold perfectly except for in the 12th grade. In reviewing the historical documentation and in conversation with CMS, we have 
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About 51 percent (10,302) of students in the sample listed their neighborhood school as their 
first choice. Since admission to neighborhood schools was guaranteed, there is no random 
variation in school attendance for this group. Of the remaining 9,719 students, nearly half 
(4,736) applied to schools that were not oversubscribed, and thus were automatically 
admitted. Another one-third of students (3,118) were in priority groups where no one was 
admitted, leaving 1,865 students who applied to schools where admission was determined by 
random lottery. We use this sample for our analysis. Note that about six percent of this 
remaining sample does not show up in any CMS school in the fall of 2002. Although these 
students can still be matched to the NSC data and are included in the results for college 
attendance and degree completion, we have no other outcome information for them.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the overall analysis sample and the lottery 
subsample. Compared to the rest of the sample, lottery applicants are disproportionately 
low-income, African American, and had lower test scores and higher absences and out-of-
school suspensions in 8th grade. Overall about 46 percent of students in the lottery sample 
are admitted to their first choice, compared to 83 percent of other students. Approximately 
63 percent of the lottery sample is comprised of rising 9th graders, while 25 percent are 
rising 10th graders and the remaining 12 percent are rising 11th graders.11
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 14 neighborhood and 3 magnet high schools in 
CMS. Schools vary widely in income, demographic composition, average student test scores 
and postsecondary attainment. Median household income ranges from $89,089 (in 2000 
dollars) in Providence to $32,744 in West Charlotte.12 Similarly, the share of minority 
(black or Hispanic) students ranges from 11 to 94 percent. Average 8th grade math scores 
have a range of around 1.3 student-level standard deviations.
Magnet high schools serve predominately nonwhite students in the lower end of the income 
distribution. This is due in part to their location in the central city, whereas many of the 
higher-income schools are located in the surrounding suburbs. Magnet schools rank near the 
district average on measures such as average test scores, high school graduation and college 
attendance. Overall, applicants to magnet schools constitute 35 percent of the lottery sample.
13 Column 4 shows the percent of students in each neighborhood school zone that are in the 
lottery sample. While students in the lottery sample are drawn disproportionately from inner 
city schools with high shares of minority students, there are many different neighborhood 
school by choice school combinations. Online Appendix Table 1 shows a matrix of counts of 
neighborhood school by choice school combinations, separated by rising grade cohorts.
some concern that additional slots may have been made available at schools for rising 12th grade applicants. Thus we exclude from the 
analysis the 85 rising 12th grade applicants who were in marginal priority groups (about 4 percent of the lottery sample).
11About 50 percent of rising 9th grade students in the lottery sample are admitted, compared to 37 percent for 10th and 11th graders. 
Less than 2 percent of rising 9th grade students have missing test score information, compared to about 10 percent for 10th and 11th 
graders combined. This is due to the fact that 8th graders would have taken End of Grade exams in CMS, whereas 9th and 10th 
graders do not have to take a uniform exam. Other than differences in missing scores and in admission rates, sample characteristics are 
very similar for students across grade cohorts.
12We assign each student the median household income in their 2000 census tract and calculate the school measures as the average of 
each student’s median tract household income.
13Note that the magnet schools do not admit all students by lottery – depending on rising grade and priority group, some students are 
automatically admitted.
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Column 5 of Table 2 shows the share of first-time rising 9th grade students in each school 
who eventually enroll in a four-year college. Column 6 presents estimates of college “value 
added”, constructed as the school average residual from a linear regression of four-year 
college attendance on a set of basic covariates from our main specifications, including a 
polynomial in prior math and reading scores.14 To minimize the mechanical influence of 
students in the lottery sample, we estimate college “value added” using first-time 9th grade 
students from Fall 1998 and 1999.15 The base rates of four-year college attendance also 
come from these two older grade cohorts.
College attendance rates range from 67 percent in Providence to 24 percent in West 
Mecklenburg, while college “value-added” ranges from 0.047 to −0.093. If the college 
“value-added” estimates were unbiased after controlling for prior characteristics, they could 
be interpreted as each school’s contribution to the chances that a randomly chosen student in 
the 9th grade cohort will attend a four-year college. In that case, switching from West 
Mecklenburg to Providence would make a student 0.047-(−0.093) = 14 percentage points 
more likely to attend a four-year college. We present the results in Column 6 not as true 
unbiased measures of school quality, but to show that demographics are not a perfect 
predictor of college attendance rates. For example, while West Charlotte has lower average 
income and lower 8th grade math scores than West Mecklenburg, freshmen in West Charlotte 
are nonetheless about 8 percentage points more likely to attend a four-year college (0.32 vs. 
0.24, Column 5). This leads to the large disparity in college “value added” among the two 
schools. Later we will examine heterogeneity in the impact of choice by this and other 
measures of school quality.
IV. Empirical Strategy
We begin by following the standard approach in lottery-based studies of school choice, 
which estimate the average impact of winning the lottery across multiple schools and grades 
(Rouse 1998; Hoxby and Rockoff 2004; Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2006; Hastings, Kane and 
Staiger 2008; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011; Deming 2011; 
Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman 2012). We estimate:
(1)
whereWij is an indicator variable that is equal to one if student i has a winning lottery 
number for admission to school j, Aij are academic outcomes of interest, Xij is a vector of 
pre-lottery covariates that is included only for improved precision,Γ j is a set of lottery fixed 
effects, and εij is a stochastic error term.16 We use only first choices in the model, so the 
number of observations in the regression is simply equal to the number of students in the 
14We estimate Aij = β Xij + vij , where vij = μj + εij. Aij is an indicator variable for whether a student ever attended a four-year 
college. The Xij vector includes indicators for race, gender, free or reduced price lunch and third order polynomials in state-
standardized 8th grade math and reading end-of-grade (EOG) exams. We pool the 9th grade cohorts of 1998 and 1999, and capture the 
school-level residual μj as our estimate of school “value-added”.
15Since the lottery sample is comprised of students from the 2000-2002 9th grade cohorts, there is no direct overlap in classrooms 
between lottery applicants and the students used to construct the “value-added” measure. The results are robust to using only one of 
the two years, and to using later grade cohorts with lottery applicants excluded from the calculation.
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sample. In principle we could estimate a nested model that incorporates multiple choices and 
accounts for students’ “risk sets” (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011). However, since students who 
lost the lottery to attend their first choice school were generally shut out of other 
oversubscribed schools, there is almost no randomization on 2nd and 3rd choices.
The β parameter from equation (1) gives the intent-to-treat (ITT) impact of winning the 
lottery on student outcomes. In most specifications, we use the lottery assignment as an 
instrumental variable (IV) for enrollment in a student’s first choice school in the Fall of 
2002. 17 This results in the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification with 
enrollment Eij as the endogenous variable in the first stage:
(2)
(3)
Since some students who lost the lottery still managed to enroll in their first choice, these 
estimates are local average treatment effects (LATEs) for students who comply with their 
lottery status (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996). Lottery fixed effects Γj are necessary to 
ensure that the ex-ante probability of admission to a first-choice school does not differ 
between lottery winners and losers (Rouse 1998). In equation (3), δ gives the weighted 
average of outcome differences summed over each individual lottery, with weights equal to 
N *[p(1– p)] where N is the number of applicants and p is the probability of admission 
(Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2006).
We can test the validity of the randomization by replacing the outcomes Aij in equation (3) 
with predetermined covariates such as race, gender and prior test scores. If the 
randomization was conducted correctly, winners and losers should be balanced on all 
characteristics that are fixed at the time of the lottery. We test this in Online Appendix Table 
2 and find no statistically significant differences between lottery winners and losers along 
pre-determined covariates.18
16The lotteries were actually conducted at the school-grade-priority group level, so the number of lotteries is greater than the number 
of schools. We suppress subscripts for grade and priority group for notational convenience. The Xij vector includes controls for 
median household income in the 2000 Census block group, race, gender, free or reduced price lunch, a third order polynomial in 8th 
grade math and reading test scores plus indicator variables for missing scores, indicators for the level of math taken in 8th grade (since 
some students are already enrolled in advanced math), and neighborhood (i.e. sending) school fixed effects.
17An alternative approach, pursued by Abdulkadiroğlu et al (2011), is to instrument for total years of enrollment in one’s first choice 
school. This allows the impact of winning the lottery to vary for students of different rising grades, but also implicitly assumes that the 
impact is linear in exposure. A linear specification is appropriate for mechanisms that unfold over time, such as exposure to college-
bound peers or gradual building of skills. Other mechanisms, such as being placed on the right “track” in courses or getting help from 
a guidance counselor, imply that equivalent impacts by rising grade are more appropriate.
18In addition, because we have the lottery numbers, priority groups, and admission outputs from the lottery computer algorithm, we 
are able to verify lottery-by-lottery that indeed lottery numbers were randomly assigned and admission complied with the lottery 
procedures.
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Table 3 examines the impact of attending a first choice school on post-secondary outcomes 
including college enrollment and degree completion. Each row contains an estimate of the 
2SLS model in equations (2) and (3), where the lottery is used as an instrument for 
enrollment. Standard errors appear below each estimate in brackets. They are clustered at the 
individual lottery level. Column 1 shows results for the full sample. Overall, we find small 
positive impacts of winning the lottery on four-year college enrollment and degree 
completion. However, we find statistically significant increases in enrollment and degree 
completion of about four percentage points in colleges that are classified by the 2009 
Barron’s Profile of American Colleges as “very competitive” or higher, which we refer to 
here as “selective” colleges. 19 These are large proportional impacts, about 40 and 60 
percent increases from the control mean baselines of 11 percentage points for attendance and 
7 percentage points for degree completion.20
The last row of Table 3 presents results from a summary index that combines information 
across all attainment outcomes (O’Brien 1984, Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007, Anderson 
2008, Deming 2009).21 In addition to the outcomes listed in Table 3, the summary index 
also includes enrollment and degree completion in any postsecondary institution (including 
2-year colleges) and in “most competitive” colleges, the most selective category according to 
the Barron’s rankings.22 To create the index, we first normalize each outcome to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. We then create a single summary index 
variable that averages across outcomes and weights by the inverse of the sample covariance 
matrix to account for dependence across outcomes (O’Brien 1984). In the last row of 
Column 1, we see that lottery winners score 0.078 standard deviations higher on the 
Attainment Index, and the impact is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
In Columns 2 and 3 we examine gender heterogeneity in the impact of winning the lottery. 
The results are from a single estimate of equations (2) and (3) with a full set of interactions 
between winning the lottery and indicator variables for whether a student is male or female. 
There are large and statistically significant differences in impacts on four-year college 
attendance for girls versus boys. Girls who attend their first choice school are almost 17 
percentage points more likely to attend a four-year college and 8 percentage points more 
likely to attend a very competitive college. In contrast, boys are actually 9 percentage points 
less likely (but not significant) to attend a four-year college and no more likely to attend a 
very competitive college. Turning to degree completion, girls are 14 and 9 percentage points 
19Schools in North Carolina with a rating of “very competitive” or higher include Appalachian State University, Duke University, 
Elon University, North Carolina State University, UNC-Asheville, UNC-Chapel Hill, UNC-Wilmington, and Wake Forest University. 
Four year public colleges in North Carolina that are less than “very competitive” include East Carolina University, Fayetteville State 
University, North Carolina A&T University, North Carolina Central University, UNC-Charlotte, UNC-Greensboro, UNC-Pembroke, 
Western Carolina University and Winston-Salem State University, as well as all of the major for-profit colleges.
20Since some enrollment and degree outcomes are relatively rare, we explore the sensitivity of our results to a nonlinear logit 
specification in online Appendix Table 4. In general, the results and their statistical significance (overall and for the subgroups in Table 
5 when applicable) hold up to nonlinear specifications such as logit and probit (not shown).
21We thank the editor for this suggestion.
22Schools in North Carolina with a rating of “most competitive” or higher include only Davidson, Duke, UNC-Chapel Hill, and Wake 
Forest. The additional outcomes are listed in Online Appendix Table 3.
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more likely to complete a degree at a four-year college and a very competitive college 
respectively, with no significant impact for boys. 23 Overall, we find an increase in 
postsecondary attainment of about 0.19 standard deviations for girls, with zero impact for 
boys, and the gender differences is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
matches the growing body of evidence that girls benefit academically more than boys from 
educational interventions (e.g. Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Anderson 2008, Angrist, 
Lang and Oreopoulos 2009, Angrist and Lavy 2009, Deming 2009, Jackson 2010, Lavy and 
Schlosser 2011, Lavy, Silva and Weinhardt 2011, Legewie and DiPrete 2012).24
Finally, we examine heterogeneity by neighborhood (i.e. sending) school. Because every 
student who applies to the same school (within a given priority group) has the same ex ante 
chance of admission, an applicant’s neighborhood school is a valid covariate on which to 
split the sample, similar to race or prior test scores. This setup allows us to compare 
treatment effects for students who applied to the same school, but who had outside options 
of different quality, generating variation in school quality gains within lottery. We divide 
schools into two groups based on their college “value-added”. We advisedly label the four 
lowest-ranked schools on the college value-added measure as “low quality” and all other 
neighborhood schools as “high quality”. This dichotomization of schools is not sensitive to 
changes such as removing a particular school or including another.25 On average, students 
who win lotteries and come from low quality neighborhood schools experience a 5.3 
percentage point increase in college value-added, compared to a decline of 1.5 percentage 
points among applicants with high quality neighborhood schools. This difference in school 
quality “dosage” is statistically significant at less than the one percent level.
Columns 4 and 5 show results separated by neighborhood school quality. Overall, 
neighborhood school quality is a strong predictor of the impact of choice on postsecondary 
attainment. We find large and statistically significant increases in high school graduation and 
college degree completion among applicants with low quality neighborhood schools, but no 
significant impacts in the “high quality” sample. An F-test of the joint hypothesis that the 
results on the attainment index are significantly different by neighborhood school quality 
yields a p-value of 0.019. In Columns 6 and 7, we show separate results by gender, within 
the low quality neighborhood school sample. These estimates come from a single regression 
specification with all four gender by school quality combinations. 26 In the low quality 
neighborhood school sample, we find positive (but imprecise) gains for boys and large, 
23Male lottery winners are somewhat more likely to attend and complete a degree at a two year college, although the impact is not 
statistically significant. We do find marginally significant increases in “most competitive” college enrollment among boys, although 
the total number of attendees is very small. Finally, part of the large increase in four-year (not competitive) college attendance and 
degree completion is driven by greater female attendance at for-profit colleges, which have shown mixed results in terms of return on 
investment (e.g. Deming, Goldin and Katz 2012). The impacts are somewhat smaller (but still significant) when for-profit colleges are 
excluded. All these results are in online Appendix Table 4.
24We also examine heterogeneous impacts by race, poverty, whether students’ 8th grade math score is above or below the median in 
the sample, and rising grade cohort (9th vs. 10th or 11th). While there are some differences in outcomes by student group, the 
summary index measures of attainment are never significantly different from each other, nor are they as large as the gender differences 
shown in Table 3. Those results are reported in online Appendix Table 5.
25In online Appendix Table 6, we present results based on some alternative rules for grouping schools based on quality. In online 
Appendix Table 7, we allow the impact of winning the lottery to vary continuously with college “value-added” by using college 
“value-added” rather than enrollment as the endogenous variable in the 2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). None of these 
alternative procedures changes the substantive nature of our conclusions.
26For space considerations we do not report results by gender for the “high quality” sample, but those results are available in online 
Appendix Table 5.
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statistically significant gains in attainment for girls. Notably, the gender difference in 
impacts in the low quality neighborhood school sample (0.10 SDs for boys, 0.29 SDs for 
girls) is very similar in size to the full sample (-0.01 SDs for boys, 0.19 SDs for girls).27
Before proceeding, we address some potential concerns with the interpretation of above 
results. First, we have college attendance data from the NSC through the Spring of 2011. 
This means that rising 9th grade students who progress normally through high school would 
be able to attend a maximum of 10 semesters (Fall 2006 to Spring 2011) of college. Thus for 
rising 9th grade students in 2002 our outcome is completion of a degree within 5 years of 
high school graduation, with additional years available for 10th and 11th graders. If lottery 
applicants are more likely to enroll and progress through college “on time” for their grade 
cohort, this limited window of data could upwardly bias our results for degree completion. 
This is a particular concern in less selective public institutions, where time-to-degree has 
increased over time (Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2012).
To address this, we examine the subset of students in our sample who appear to be persisting 
continuously in college through Spring 2011.28 In online Appendix Table 8, we reconstruct 
our main outcomes in Table 3 under the assumption that all lottery losers, but no lottery 
winners, who persist continuously eventually obtain a degree. With this very conservative 
assumption, we find a decline in four-year degree completion of only about 3.5 percentage 
points, and zero impact on degree completion at very competitive colleges. Moreover, results 
for the summary index of attainment are still positive and marginally significant. This 
suggests that the increase in degree completion among lottery winners is unlikely to shrink 
much with additional years of data.
A second concern with our interpretation is that neighborhood school quality is simply an 
indicator for other differences between students in the two samples. For example, students 
from low quality neighborhood schools differ systematically by income and prior test scores, 
and those characteristics may drive the gains from choice. However, in online Appendix 
Table 9 we show that the greater impacts in the “low quality” neighborhood school sample 
hold within splits across a wide variety of covariates, including race, poverty and prior test 
scores. Following Angrist et al. (2011), we implement an Oaxaca-Blinder-style 
decomposition, which shows that the difference in impacts by neighborhood school quality 
cannot be attributed to differences in observed student characteristics.29 While we cannot 
fully rule out that lottery applicants differ across neighborhood schools along unobserved 
dimensions in ways that are correlated with the impacts of choice, we find no evidence that 
differences in observed student characteristics are driving the differences in impacts by 
neighborhood school quality.
27Boys in the “high quality” neighborhood school sample score about 0.09 standard deviations (SDs) lower on the summary index of 
attainment, while girls score about 0.10 SDs higher. Neither estimate is statistically significant.
28We define continuous persistence as continuous enrollment from graduation through Spring 2011 with a gap of no more than one 
semester (not including summers). 50 of the 112 students still enrolled in a four-year college in Spring 2011 meet this definition (34 if 
we do not allow for any gaps). Of the 112 students who were still enrolled, 43.8 percent of lottery winners were “persisters” compared 
with 45.3 percent of lottery losers.
29The results of this decomposition are in online Appendix Table 10, along with a more detailed description of the procedure.
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We next investigate the extent to which school characteristics, including peers, may 
contribute to our findings. Table 4 reports the impact of attending one’s first-choice school 
on peer and school characteristics, including summary index measures of peer quality and 
school resources (including teachers).30 It follows the same structure Table 3. We report 
results for two measures of school quality that attempt to control for observed differences in 
peers - college “value added” (from Table 2), and a school-level measure of “on track” in 9th 
grade that controls for prior differences in academic preparation.31 We note that these 
residualized measures of school quality will not account for unobserved differences or 
nonlinearities in peer quality, such as a “critical mass” of able peers, which could lead 
directly to changes in course offerings, teacher quality and improved resources. For space 
reasons we present only a limited selection of school characteristics, with the full set of 
results available in online Appendix Table 11.
The combined results of Table 4 lead to two important conclusions. First, comparing 
columns 2 and 3 and columns 6 and 7, we find no evidence for gender differences in 
measures of peer or school quality. Since boys and girls in the lottery sample apply to and 
attend similar schools and come from similar neighborhoods, differences in outcomes must 
reflect gender differences in responsiveness to school or peer quality. Second, comparing 
columns 4 and 5, we find significant differences in both peer and school quality between 
applicants coming from low- versus high-quality neighborhood schools. Since our quality 
measure is college “value-added” (seen here in the last row of Table 4), this amounts to 
observing that college “value-added” is strongly correlated with a variety of measures of 
school quality.
In the first three rows of Table 4, we see that lottery winners from low-quality neighborhood 
schools who attend their first choice school have peers that are significantly stronger 
academically (e.g. 0.36 SDs higher 8th grade math scores), but relatively similar in terms of 
demographics. Moving to school characteristics, we see that they have significantly smaller 
classes in End-of-Course (EOC) subjects and are substantially more likely to have a teacher 
with a bachelor’s degree from a selective college. In contrast, lottery winners from high-
quality neighborhood schools experience no significant increases in observed measures of 
peer or school quality, with significant declines in resources in a few cases. Finally, we also 
find that lottery winners attend schools with a greater share of students who are “on track” in 
their math and science courses toward a college-preparatory diploma. This measure reflects 
a combination of 1) differences in the prior academic preparation of peers, and 2) differences 
30Students in the lottery sample are excluded from the calculation of the peer quality measures to avoid a mechanical correlation with 
the outcome. Each index is normalized and weighted as described earlier in the text. The peer index contains measures of peers’ 8th 
grade math and reading scores, days suspended from school, days absent, and prior EOC math coursework (some students take 
Algebra I in 8th grade). The resource/teacher index includes measures of class size in EOC courses, the ratio of books to students and 
students to computers, whether students’ EOC course teachers are first year teachers, the selectivity of the colleges attended by EOC 
teachers (very competitive, most competitive), guidance counselors per capita, and the selectivity of colleges attended by guidance 
counselors.
31The college “value-added” measure is described in Section III. The “on track” measure is a summary index of the school-level 
residuals from regressions of the probability that a student is in Algebra I or higher and Biology or higher in 9th grade, controlling for 
a full set of covariates including prior test scores and EOC math placement. For both “on track” measures, we use the rising 9th grade 
cohorts of 1998 and 1999, several years prior to the lottery, in order to minimize reflection problems with the lottery sample (Manski 
1993).
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in the academic rigor of the school holding peer quality constant. While these mechanisms 
cannot be fully separated, we can show that lottery winners from low-quality neighborhood 
schools attend schools where students are more likely to stay on track conditional on 
baseline test scores. For lottery winners with low quality neighborhood schools, the 
magnitude (0.93 SDs on the residual “on track” index, Column 5) is very similar to the 
change in peer quality (0.98 SDs).
While the impacts on some measures appear larger than others, this is difficult to interpret 
without information about the causal impact of each input on postsecondary attainment. For 
example, even though the mean impact of choice on resource and teacher quality is not 
statistically significant, perhaps there are certain inputs (for example, teacher or guidance 
counselor college selectivity) that have a large influence on student outcomes, and thus 
should be weighted more heavily. Without a variety of experiments that carefully manipulate 
teachers, peers and other school attributes, we cannot separately identify the impact of each 
input. Moreover, as Table 4 shows, they are highly collinear.
Still, the distinction between peers and inputs that can be affected directly by policy is 
particularly important. Jackson (2010) finds that direct peer quality accounts for only 10 
percent of school “value-added” overall, but one-third among highly selective schools. 
Similarly, recent work that identifies the impacts of attending a better school for students at 
the margin of admission using a regression discontinuity (RD) design finds mixed results 
(Clark 2010, Jackson 2010, Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011, 
Dobbie and Fryer 2011). In particular, Dobbie and Fryer (2011) find no impact of admission 
to selective exam schools in New York City on postsecondary outcomes, despite large gains 
in peer quality. Because these RD studies necessarily compare the highest scoring students 
in a lower-ranked school to the lowest scoring students in a higher ranked school, they 
identify peer effects (and responses to resources and other school-level differences) at a 
particular margin. These impacts will not necessarily generalize to the range of applicants in 
a school choice lottery, particularly in high school when identity and peer sorting can 
generate unpredictable results (Akerlof and Kranton 2002, Carrell, Sacerdote and West 
2011, Cicala, Fryer and Spenkuch 2011).
Our main results for attainment are broadly consistent with the gains we find on measures of 
peer quality. However, we also find that the impacts for lottery winners are larger when they 
gain more resources and teacher quality (although the estimates are noisy), and when they 
gain more on school-level measures of college “value added” and keeping students “on 
track”. Importantly, these last two measures explicitly control for observed differences in 
peers across schools, and may be proxies for important school policies and practices that we 
do not observe. Nonetheless, the evidence on mechanisms is ultimately suggestive, 
particularly in an environment where students, peers, teachers and parents may respond by 
adjusting their behavior or effort in a variety of ways (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011).
One alternative approach, which we pursue in Online Appendix Table 7, is to use various 
measures of school quality as first-stage endogenous variables. In principle, we could 
determine which measures of quality are most correlated with increased attainment, 
controlling for the others. However, while many of the measures are strong predictors 
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independently, there is insufficient variation to identify mechanisms when multiple measures 
are included.
More importantly, however, any explanation of our results must account for gender 
differences in responsiveness to peer or school quality. We examine these in more detail in 
Table 5.
V.C Mediating Outcomes in High School
Table 5 presents results for a broad range of academic outcomes in high school. For space 
reasons we present only a small selection of academic outcomes, with the full set of results 
available in Online Appendix Table 12. The last row of Table 5 is a summary index of all 
mediating outcomes (constructed identically to the summary indices in Tables 3 and 4), 
including those not presented in the table. In reading this table it is important to remember 
that we do not observe high school outcomes (as opposed to college outcomes) for students 
who leave CMS. 32 However, high school outcomes may uncover important intermediate 
changes in student’s achievement and experiences, pointing to potential mechanisms 
underlying our main results.
Lottery winners who attend their first choice school have higher cumulative grade point 
averages, complete more total EOC math courses, and are more likely to stay “on track” 
towards completing college preparatory math requirements. 33 We find no increases in 
advanced placement (AP) math course-taking, nor do we find evidence of increased 
enrollment in advanced math or science classes such as pre-calculus, statistics or physics 
(results for these subjects and many others, including extracurricular programs, are included 
in online Appendix Table 13). In the last row of Column 1, we find an overall increase of 
about 0.06 SDs on a summary index of all mediating outcomes. In Columns 2 and 3, we see 
that, like postsecondary attainment, these overall gains are driven entirely by girls. The 
pattern of impacts by gender and school quality for the main results in Table 3 also holds 
here, with small and imprecise gains for boys but large gains for girls from “low quality” 
neighborhood schools.
We find no impact on the SAT scores overall or in any of the subsamples in Table 4. Yet we 
do find large and statistically significant increases in SAT exam-taking among girls, 
32In online Appendix Table 13 we show that lottery winners are 2 percentage points more likely to enroll in CMS in the Fall after 
choice, and approximately 5 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in CMS by Spring 2004. We deal with missing data in two 
ways. First, we vary our treatment of missing outcome information. For the SAT and EOC exam-taking outcomes, we count students 
who do not take the exam because they are no longer in CMS as zeroes. Similarly, we measure cumulative course-taking including all 
students in the sample, regardless of when they exit CMS. However, our measures of “on track” course-taking (both by year and by 
subject, i.e. “on track in math in 2002-2003 and ”geometry or higher by 10th grade“) are all conditional on students being enrolled in 
CMS in the indicated year or grade. Second, we investigate the sensitivity of these results to a wide variety of assumptions about 
differential attrition in online Appendix Table 14. In general, imputation of missing scores and course-taking variables leaves the 
results substantively unchanged. Bounding exercises for exam and course-taking results generally fail to diminish the statistical 
significance of those findings. However, bounding exercises for EOC test score or SAT impacts lead to confidence intervals that are 
too wide to draw any firm conclusions.
33High school GPA is a summary measure calculated at the end of each year and provided to us by CMS. We do not have information 
on grades separated out by course. Students who leave CMS or drop out during high school are included in this measure, with their 
cumulative GPA as of the last semester of enrollment. EOC math courses are Algebra I, Geometry and Algebra II, with state-
standardized exams at the end of course. ”On Track“ is defined as taking Algebra I by 9th grade, Geometry by 10th grade and Algebra 
II by 11th grade, given that the North Carolina requirements for a college-preparatory diploma are the 3 EOC courses plus one 
additional more advanced course (4 total).
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especially girls in the low quality neighborhood school sample. This pattern of imprecise 
impacts on scores but increases in taking the exam and “on track” course-taking also holds 
across all of the EOC math and science subjects. Lottery winners who attend their first 
choice school are more likely to graduate from a CMS high school, with a larger point 
estimate among girls, though coming from a low-quality school appears to be the driving 
factor for this outcome.34
Overall, the pattern of impacts for mediating outcomes closely matches the main results in 
Table 3. The Mediator Index in the final row tells a clear story of girls responding positively 
to their new academic environment, suggesting that the gender differences we find in our 
main results are reflected in gender differences in high school experiences.
VI. Explaining Gender Differences in Responsiveness to School Quality
We consider three broad explanations for gender differences in responsiveness to school 
quality. First, the girls may differ from the boys in the lottery sample in terms of prior 
academic preparation or other characteristics. However, we find no evidence of gender 
differences in pre-treatment covariates such as income and prior test scores. Girls and boys 
in the lottery sample have nearly identical 8th grade test scores, and we find no difference in 
covariates by gender within choice lotteries. Moreover, girls and boys are balanced across 
neighborhoods and choice schools, and an analysis of individual lotteries reveals that the 
treatment effect for girls is greater in nearly every case. Thus we conclude that the pattern of 
impacts by gender is not a function of other observed characteristics.35
Second, girls may respond to new environments and peer groups in ways that are more 
conducive to academic achievement. Several recent studies in school settings have found 
greater impacts for girls (e.g. Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Kling, Liebman and Katz 
2007, Anderson 2008, Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos 2009, Angrist and Lavy 2009, Jackson 
2010). Qualitative work on gender differences in the Chicago public schools and in the 
Moving to Opportunity housing mobility experiment found important gender differences in 
coping mechanisms and responses to the stress of a new environment, perhaps because of an 
absence of same-sex role models in the home or in school, and greater conflict with the 
norms of an academic or culturally dominant environment (Roderick 2003, Clampet-
Lundquist et al. 2006).
A related possibility is that boys respond less productively to increased competition from 
peers. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that while males are more likely to seek out 
tournament competition conditional on ability, they also overestimate their performance rank 
within a group. Interestingly, Barankay (2011) finds that when employees are privately 
34Because we have NSC data for students who do not graduate from CMS, we can explore the sensitivity of the high school 
graduation results by coding non-graduates who attend college as graduates. When we code as graduates any student who ever 
attended a 4 year college, the point estimate drops to 0.049 with a standard error of 0.034. However, some of these students drop out, 
obtain a GED and attend a non-selective four-year college such as the University of Phoenix. When we restrict the change to students 
who attend a very competitive (or more) college, the estimate increases slightly to 0.058 with a standard error of 0.033.
35If we regress four year college attendance in the full sample on all pre-treatment covariates except gender, the predicted values for 
students in the lottery sample are 0.437 for girls and 0.419 for boys, and the difference is not significantly different from zero. Also, 
Dee (2005) finds that girls perform better when they have female teachers, yet we find no evidence that lottery winners have higher 
shares of female teachers.
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informed about their performance rank within a group, males respond more negatively to 
declines in relative ranking. The results in Table 5 show that female lottery winners have 
higher GPAs, while boys do not. However, GPAs are higher on average in higher quality 
schools. We find that the GPA improvements for female lottery winners place them at the 
same class rank as girls who lose the lottery (2nd row of Table 5, columns 2 and 3). 
However, the insignificant results for boys’ GPA lead to a statistically significant decline of 
about 6.5 percentile ranks within grade cohort. This evidence is consistent with boys 
responding negatively (or less positively) to increased competition in a new school 
environment. This pattern holds as well for the summary index of mediating outcomes – 
female lottery winners and losers perform at about the median for their school, but lottery 
winners attend schools where students have better grades and more difficult coursework. On 
the other hand, male lottery winners typically rank lower in the distribution of grades and 
course rigor when they attend their first choice school.
Third, girls may increase effort more than boys in response to a more academically 
demanding environment. While boys and girls are equally likely to be “on track” in math at 
the end of the first school year after choice, by the end of the second year only girls are still 
more likely to be “on track” for a college-preparatory diploma (rows 4 and 5 of Table 5). In 
row 6 of Table 5, we see that this is likely due to a statistically significant increase in the 
probability that male lottery winners (especially in the “high quality” neighborhood school 
sample) will fail an EOC math course at some point during high school. The lack of any 
initial gender difference in the probability of being “on track” suggests that while boys and 
girls are initially assigned to similar classes, boys are more likely to struggle. Several studies 
have found that conditional on academic ability, girls spend more time on homework and 
have better study habits (Jacob 2002, Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Frenette and Zeman 
2007). Girls might work harder in higher quality schools because they have higher expected 
returns to a college education (Charles and Luoh 2003, Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko 2006, 
DiPrete and Buchmann 2006). Increased effort could also be a response to gender 
differences in peer group pressure (Akerlof and Kranton 2002, Clampet-Lunquist et al. 
2006).
VII. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we study the impact of winning an admissions lottery to attend a public high 
school in Charlotte-Mecklenburg on college enrollment and degree completion. We find 
increases in postsecondary attainment that are concentrated among girls and students from 
low quality neighborhood schools. We show that the benefits of choice are greater for lottery 
applicants who experience larger gains in school quality, although we are unable to 
separately disentangle mechanisms such as peer effects, resources and teachers that may be 
at play.
This finding is important in light of the growing returns to post-secondary education and 
increasing inequality of opportunity by race and income in the United States (Duncan and 
Murnane 2011). Our findings imply that school choice can lead to long-run gains in 
educational attainment, but only when applicants gain access to higher quality schools. Our 
results also show that high school quality exerts an important influence on some students’ 
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life chances, suggesting that later life interventions may have a high social return on 
investment, provided that we can uncover the correct mechanisms (e.g. Heckman, 2006).
Finally, we find that girls are more responsive than boys to gains in school quality. While 
ultimately we can only speculate about the reasons, we note that the results are consistent 
with growing evidence on the reverse gender gap in achievement when low-income children 
are moved into a more academically competitive environment (Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko 
2006, Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007, Bailey and 
Dynarski 2011). Uncovering the underlying reasons for gender differences in responsiveness 
to an improved environment remains an important issue for explaining the growing female 
advantage in completed schooling.
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Free/Reduced Price Lunch 0.424 0.633
8th Grade Reading Score (standardized) 0.036 −0.254
8th Grade Math Score (standardized) −0.009 −0.278
Missing Reading and Math Scores 0.086 0.057
8th Grade Days Absent 9.020 10.890
8th Grade Days Out-of-School Suspended 1.350 2.150
Distance to Neighborhood School (miles) 4.320 4.540
Indicator if Admitted to First Choice 0.830 0.460
Sample Size 18,156 1,865
Notes: Sample consists of rising 9th to 11th grade students in the Fall of 2002 who were also enrolled in CMS in the previous school year. 8th 
grade end-of-year (EOG) scores in math and reading are standardized at the state-year level. Median household income is calculated as the average 
value within each student’s 2000 Census block group.
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TABLE 2































Myers Park 63,382 0.286 0.441 0.050 0.590 0.047
West Charlotte 32,744 0.939 −0.745 0.150 0.320 0.038
Providence 89,089 0.110 0.603 0.010 0.670 0.037
South Mecklenburg 67,177 0.203 0.331 0.070 0.540 0.018
East Mecklenburg 50,890 0.467 −0.044 0.130 0.470 0.014
Garinger 37,273 0.807 −0.662 0.170 0.290 0.003
Hopewell 67,998 0.288 0.001 0.040 0.530 −0.001
North Mecklenburg 66,861 0.256 0.255 0.030 0.540 −0.007
Independence 49,287 0.536 −0.106 0.080 0.430 −0.008
Butler 59,113 0.249 0.168 0.030 0.480 −0.009
Vance 52,514 0.630 −0.239 0.110 0.420 −0.039
Olympic 53,027 0.499 −0.180 0.130 0.370 −0.042
Waddell 43,901 0.660 −0.491 0.150 0.280 −0.056
West Mecklenburg 40,534 0.649 −0.504 0.160 0.240 −0.093
Magnet Schools
Northwest Arts 52,654 0.3 88 −0.166 n/a 0.490 0.032
Harding University 43,643 0.678 0.089 n/a 0.530 0.007
Berry Academy 41,568 0.790 −0.223 n/a n/a n/a
Notes: The first fourteen schools are neighborhood schools, listed in order of the college “value-added” measure in Column 6. The last three 
schools are magnet schools with no assigned neighborhood zone. Column 1 shows median household income in the census tract where students in 
each school reside (based on the 2000 Census). 8th grade math scores in Column 3 are normalized at the state level. Column 4 shows the share of 
students from each neighborhood zone that are in the lottery sample. Columns 5 and 6 are calculated based on student average characteristics in the 
Fall 1998 and 1999 rising 9th grade cohorts, to minimize the influence of the lottery sample. College “value added” in Column 6 is estimated as the 
school average residual from a student-level regression of an indicator for four year college enrollment on the set of covariates in equations (2) and 
(3), including student demographics and prior math and reading scores. See text for details.
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TABLE 3
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Sample Size 1,8 65 994 871 1,070 795 416 379
Notes: Each estimate reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of attending a first choice school, using enrollment in Fall 2002 as the 
endogenous variable in the first stage of the 2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and clustered 
at the lottery (school-grade-priority group) level. In columns 2 through 7, indicators for winning the lottery are interacted with the subgroup 
categories as instruments, and each set of subgroups (i.e. gender, gender and school quality) is mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. 
“Low quality” neighborhood schools are the 4 lowest ranked schools on the college “value-added” measure listed in Table 2 - all others are defined 
as “high quality”. The attainment index in the last row is a summary measure of all the outcomes above plus enrollment and degree completion in 
any college (including 2-year) and “most competitive” colleges, and is weighted to account for dependence across outcomes as described in the 
text. Measures of college quality are calculated using the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges - see text for details.
*
- sig. 5% level.
**
- sig. 1% level.
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TABLE 5













































































































































































Sample Size 1,8 65 994 871 1,070 795 416 379
Notes: The sample size listed is for the mediator summary index - sample sizes for individual outcomes vary. Each estimate reports the local 
average treatment effect (LATE) of attending a first choice school, using enrollment in Fall 2002 as the endogenous variable in the first stage of the 
2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and clustered at the lottery (school-grade-priority group) 
level. In columns 2 through 7, indicators for winning the lottery are interacted with the subgroup categories as instruments, and each set of 
subgroups (i.e. gender, gender and school quality) is mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. “Low quality” neighborhood schools are the 4 
lowest ranked schools on the college “value-added” measure listed in Table 2 - all others are defined as “high quality”. EOC math are state 
standardized courses in Algebra I, Geometry and Algebra II, and are required for graduation with a college-preparatory diploma. The mediator 
index in the last row is a summary measure of all the outcomes above it plus the outcomes listed in Appendix Table A12, and is weighted to 
account for dependence across outcomes as described in the text.
*
- sig. 5% level.
**
- sig. 1% level.
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